Security
Designed so you don't
have to trust anyone.
What Sigilkeep protects, how, and where its protection ends.
Status
Sigilkeep has not had an independent security audit. It is built from standard, well-studied primitives, has automated adversarial tests and a recorded security test campaign, and its design is described on this page.
Cryptography
Standard, well-studied building blocks, used the way they were designed to be used.
Encryption
XChaCha20-Poly1305 for everything stored in a vault, so every object is both encrypted and authenticated.
Passwords
Argon2id, with 256 MiB of memory and 3 passes by default, so every guess is slow, even on special hardware.
How Argon2id worksKeys
One random root key per vault, stored only wrapped under your credentials. HKDF-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA256 split it into a separate key for each purpose.
Keyfiles (optional)
A 256-bit random file. In keyfile mode the vault can’t be opened without it, and the key derivation itself enforces that.
Tamper detection
Swapped, cut, repeated or rolled-back pieces of a vault are detected and reported, not silently accepted.
No back door
No master key, no escrow, no recovery phrase and no reset. Nobody else can open your vault, including me.
In plain English
How Argon2id protects your password
Your vault is not locked with your password itself. Sigilkeep feeds your password, together with a random value called a salt that is different for every vault, into a recipe called Argon2id. The recipe’s result is the key that opens the vault.
Heavy on purpose
Each time Argon2id runs, it has to fill 256 MiB of memory and stir through all of it three times before it gives an answer. You hardly notice: you type your password and wait a moment.
No shortcut for a thief
Someone who has stolen a copy of your vault has to guess the password, and every guess goes through the whole recipe, memory and all. Trying millions of passwords means doing that work millions of times.
Why memory matters
The special chips attackers use to guess quickly are fast at sums but short of memory. Needing 256 MiB for every guess makes each one costly for them too.
Why the salt matters
Every vault has its own salt, so an attacker can’t prepare a list of answers in advance, and the same password in two vaults gives two different keys.
What it can’t do
It slows guessing down, but it can’t make a weak password strong. Use a long passphrase of several unrelated words, or add a keyfile: then the password alone opens nothing.
Primer
Argon2id, from the beginning
A short guide for the curious: what Argon2id is, where it came from, how its settings work, and exactly how Sigilkeep uses it.
- Your passwordTidied into one standard form (Unicode NFC), so the same password typed on a Mac or an iPhone gives the same result.
- Argon2idMixed with this vault’s random salt, using 256 MiB of memory, 3 passes and 4 lanes. Out comes a 32-byte result.
- HKDF-SHA256Turns that result, together with your keyfile if the vault uses one, into a key-encryption key bound to this one vault.
- Vault keyThe key-encryption key unwraps the vault’s own random key, which encrypts your files. The password never touches your files directly.
What it is
Argon2 is a password-hashing function: a deliberately slow, memory-hungry recipe that turns a password into a key. It won the international Password Hashing Competition in 2015 and was published as an internet standard, RFC 9106, in 2021. Argon2id is the variant that standard recommends.
Why “id”
Argon2 comes in two styles. Argon2i reads memory in an order that does not depend on your password, which resists attacks that watch timing on a shared machine. Argon2d reads memory in a password-dependent order, which is hardest for custom cracking hardware. Argon2id does the first half of its first pass the “i” way and the rest the “d” way, to get both.
| Setting | Value | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Memory (m) | 256 MiB | Every guess must fill and use this much memory, which is what makes guessing in bulk expensive. |
| Passes (t) | 3 | How many times the memory is worked through. More passes, more time per guess. |
| Lanes (p) | 4 | Lets your device use several cores at once, so unlocking stays quick for you without making it cheaper for an attacker. |
| Salt | 32 random bytes | Different for every vault and every unlock method, so precomputed tables are useless and equal passwords give different keys. |
For comparison, the OWASP password storage guidance sets a floor of 19 MiB and 2 passes. Sigilkeep uses more than ten times that memory, because a vault key protects files for years, not a web login.
How does it compare with PBKDF2, bcrypt and scrypt?
PBKDF2 only costs time, so graphics cards can run huge numbers of guesses side by side. bcrypt uses a small, fixed amount of memory. scrypt was the first to make memory the main cost, and Argon2 refined that idea with clearer settings and better resistance to trading memory for time. That is why it is the current recommendation.
Can the settings change later?
Yes. The settings are stored with each unlock method in the vault, so a future version can raise them. Sigilkeep never lowers them silently: a device that cannot meet a vault’s settings says so instead of weakening them.
Does changing my password re-encrypt my files?
No. Only the small wrapped copy of the vault key is redone with the new password. Your files stay as they are, so the change is instant even for a large vault.
Does Face ID or a YubiKey skip Argon2id?
Those unlock methods hold their own random 256-bit secret instead of a password, so there is nothing to guess and no need to slow guessing down. Your password slot keeps its Argon2id protection alongside them.
So how strong should my password be?
Argon2id multiplies the cost of every guess, but it cannot rescue a password that is near the top of a guessing list. A passphrase of four or more unrelated words, or a keyfile kept apart from the vault, puts the vault out of reach of guessing.
Against a hostile storage provider
Sigilkeep assumes the cloud folder may be read, changed, reordered or replayed by someone else.
- Contents, file names, folder structure, timestamps and logical sizes are encrypted.
- Every object is bound to its vault, its file and its position, so swapping, truncating or repeating pieces is detected.
- Rolling a vault back to an older state is detected on devices that have seen a newer one.

Limits
No encryption tool can do everything. Sigilkeep cannot:
- Hide how many encrypted objects a vault has, roughly how big they are, or when they change. Your storage provider can see that.
- Stop someone with write access to the folder from deleting it. Keep backups.
- Protect files on a device that is infected with malware while the vault is unlocked.
- Recover a vault if you lose your password, or your keyfile in keyfile mode.
What Sigilkeep sends over the network
Your files, file names, passwords, keyfiles and vault keys never leave your device unencrypted. Your sync service uploads the encrypted vault folder on its own; Sigilkeep never connects to it. The only connections Sigilkeep itself makes are for Sigilkeep Pro:
| What | Where to | When |
|---|---|---|
| The Pro purchase check | Apple’s App Store, through the system on your device | Mac, iPhone and iPad: when you buy Pro or restore purchases |
Report a vulnerability
Please email security@sigilkeep.app. You can expect an acknowledgement within 5 working days and an initial assessment within 14 days. Disclosure is coordinated, normally within 90 days of the report or when a fix is released, whichever is first. Credit is given if you want it. There is no paid bug bounty. See also security.txt.
Use synthetic data only. Never send real vault files, passwords, keyfiles or licence keys: I will never ask for them, and I couldn’t use them to unlock anything. Forgetting a password is not a vulnerability; Sigilkeep has no recovery by design.
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